Nash Equilibrium Through the Lens of Fixed Point Theory

Authors

  • Kumam Anthony Singh Department of Mathematics, Manipur University, Imphal, India Author

Keywords:

Nash equilibrium, fixed point theory, Brouwer theorem

Abstract

Nash equilibria are fixed points of best-response correspondences. This talk shows how Brouwer's and Kakutani's fixed point theorems establish the existence of Nash equilibria in strategic games. We illustrate this through three examples: Prisoner's Dilemma (pure strategy), Matching Pennies (mixed strategy), and Cournot duopoly (continuous strategy). Designed for PhD students and junior researchers, the talk connects nonlinear analysis to game-theoretic equilibrium via Nash's classical 1950-1951 proofs.

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Published

2026-01-20

Issue

Vol. 8 No. 1 (2026): Abstracts of International Conference on Advances in Multidisciplinary Sciences and Engineering 2026

Section

Abstracts

License

Creative Commons License

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How to Cite

[1]
K. A. Singh, “Nash Equilibrium Through the Lens of Fixed Point Theory”, AIJR Abs., vol. 8, no. 1, p. 123, Jan. 2026, Accessed: Jun. 04, 2026. [Online]. Available: https://abstracts.aijr.org/index.php/abs/article/view/259